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Greek banks are close to collapse, even if a new bail-out programme is agreed soon. The 
deterioration of the economy means that their fragile capital position is deteriorating further. 
Any new programme needs to include recapitalisation, comprising possibly a bail-in and 
restructuring to get the banking system working again. With only a small part of the assets 
unencumbered and a government with empty pockets, the depositors might have to take a large 
part of the burden. As private investors are unlikely to participate in a recapitalisation, foreign 
official funds will be needed. A direct equity investment by the EIB or the EBRD could be used 
to transfer control rights and special ESM bonds could be used to provide additional capital 
without entailing additional risk to the creditors. 
ince the escalation of the country’s debt problems in 2010, the Greek banking sector1 has 
been suffering. At the beginning of the crisis, Greek banks appeared to be the innocent 
victim of the government’s default. Their large holdings of government debt had to be 
written down when the PSI (private sector involvement) operation of March 2012 forced them 
to accept a haircut of over 50%.  After 2012, the economy continued to deteriorate for a while, 
leading to a massive increase in non-performing loans (NPL) and losses. However, these losses 
were compensated by a recapitalisation with EFSF/ESM funds, leaving the government (via its 
Hellenic Bank rescue fund) with a dominant ownership in the remaining four large banks, which 
account for 90% of the sector. In 2014, when the economy seemed to have stabilised, private 
investors were so confident that they poured €8.3 billion into the sector, somewhat diluting the 
government’s stakes, but allowing the banks to pass the ECB/EBA stress test. 
The private investment in 2014 was based on the expectation that the Greek economy was 
stabilising, thus stemming further losses and that the robust recovery foreseen for this year 
would soon allow the banks to become profitable again soon. However, given the political 
uncertainty created by the elections of January this year and the continuing threat of a default 
and potentially a Grexit, the economy has tanked and deposit flight has set in. The banks are 
thus confronted simultaneously with a liquidity problem and mounting losses.  
                                                   
1 Greek banks still hold substantial investments in banking operations abroad. These investments have 
been little affected by the Greek crisis.  But the value of these foreign investments has fallen along with 
the generalised decline in the sector since 2008. 
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The bank run should abate if there is a new programme. But the closure of the banks, and the 
capital controls, have already done irreparable damage to the economy. This implies that non-
performing loans are bound to increase considerably, eating up the small capital buffers. The 
banks are thus likely to be insolvent very soon even if a new programme materialises. This 
leads to a tangle of legal and political problems given the unfinished state of the Banking Union. 
Since the end of last year, the SSM (an arm of the ECB) is the supervisor for the four large 
Greek banks and it thus the responsibility of the SSM to declare that these banks are “failing or 
in danger of failing”. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) would then supervise any 
restructuring. But any restructuring plan would have to be implemented and financed by the 
Greek authorities. 
The key immediate problem is that any finding of the SSM that the Greek banks are failing (or 
in danger of failing soon) would require the eurosystem (i.e. technically the Bank of Greece) to 
immediately call back all ELA. But this would mean a shutdown of the entire banking system.   
What is needed is thus a recapitalisation/restructuring plan, executed ideally over a weekend, 
under which the banks would recognise the losses resulting from the deteriorating economic 
situation and either find sufficient additional capital, which today can be estimated at about €15 
billion, or bail in enough creditors to be able to reopen immediately with a viable capital 
position. This would then allow ELA (emergency lending assistance) to continue, and would 
open the way to a slow return of confidence and deposits under a new programme. 
However, it is impossible to restructure banks with an empty purse. 
Under EU rules, deposits are guaranteed up to €100,000. Given that all large deposits have 
already fled, this implies that the Greek banks have few liabilities left that could be bailed in. 
Moreover, the government clearly does not have the means to guarantee the remaining deposits 
(of around €150 billion). 
This means that the banks will need to receive an infusion of capital from either the Greek 
government or the ESM.  An infusion of Greek government bonds is unlikely to restore the 
confidence of depositors, which leaves a recapitalisation by the ESM as the main alternative. 
However, the creditors are understandably reluctant to provide additional capital for a banking 
system that is draining funds and whose assets (loans to Greek companies and households) 
could be rendered worthless by government action (the government could – indeed has – 
announced a moratorium on collateral seizures, or any change in bankruptcy legislation). One 
solution to this ‘time-inconsistency’ problem would be to provide Greek banks with special, 
non-tradable ESM bonds as new capital. These bonds would have a special provision: they 
would not be payable in case the Greek government decides to exit the euro area or undertakes 
any measures that materially affect the solvency of the banks. 
An infusion of these special ESM bonds could thus take care, partially, of the credibility and 
time-inconsistency problem. What remains is the governance problem: given the political 
situation in Greece, the Hellenic Bank fund (HFSF) will be under enormous pressures and 
objective conflicts of interest. It might thus be best to transfer the formal ownership of the banks 
to either the EBRD or an investment arm of the EIB. This could be done via an infusion of a 
(small) quantity of real equity capital from these institutions. An equity stake by these two 
European institutions should also increase the confidence of Greek savers, accelerating the 
return of deposits. 
